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On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance

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Research on political tolerance has made substantial progress in recent years by improving the measures used to gauge public opinion. Much attention has been devoted to developing indicators that control for group affect. Controls for activity affect have not been pursued as vigorously. Indeed, much of the progress has been along the lines of specifying tolerance for unpopular political minorities rather than tolerance for unorthodox or threatening political activities. More generally, tolerance research has not been sensitive to the variety of contextual factors that determine citizen attitudes in civil-liberties disputes.

A new approach to measuring political tolerance is presented in this article. The measures developed in this approach disaggregate the traditional measures of tolerance (such as Stouffer's (1955) support for "a communist making a speech in your community"). In particular, scales measuring support for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of political association are presented. As multiple-indicator measures posing conflicts among values, these scales are related to traditional tolerance measures. However, because they reflect the complexity and conflict associated with actual civil-liberties disputes, they will no doubt serve as better predictors of opinions and behaviors in actual disputes.

Theories of political tolerance have not been immune to the tide of revisionist activity sweeping most areas of public opinion and political behavior research. As in so many fields, the body of knowledge about tolerance which has accumulated since the 1950s is being qualified in many important ways. As times change, "constants" become variables, and opportunities to develop more sophisticated and comprehensive models are generated. In response to this opportunity, tolerance research has experienced renewed interest and activity.

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One of the most important new developments can be found in the work of John Sullivan and his colleagues (Sullivan et al. 1981, 1979, 1978-79), who have argued, contrary to Nunn, Crockett, and Williams (1978), and Davis (1975), that the level of tolerance in the United States has not increased since the 1950s. Using an innovative measure of the concept, they discover that the objects of intolerance have become more numerous and more ideologically diverse. Other recent work has also presented alternative conceptualizations of tolerance (Jukam 1979; Lawrence 1976) and more recent data have become available to update the findings of older approaches (cf. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). Inquiry has been expanded across cultures (Seligson and Caspi, in press; Muller, Pesonen, and Jukam 1980). There has even been some effort at relating tolerant attitudes to political behavior (Muller 1979). This renewed vitality reflects a basic dissatisfaction with the limits of the theories and data produced in the 1950s.

Yet the revision and elaboration of theories of political tolerance are still in their infancy, and many questions are far from settled. For instance, the conceptualization and measurement of political tolerance has advanced, but largely along the lines of specifying tolerance for unpopular political minorities rather than tolerance for unorthodox or threatening political activities. Little theory exists to account for variation in attitudes toward tolerance (but see Sullivan et al. 1981), and there is still a need to elaborate and explain differences between elite and mass attitudes. Nor

has there been much success in relating tolerant attitudes to political behavior, and the whole question of the linkage between intolerant citizen attitudes and public policy is only beginning to be explored (Barnum, in press). Although more data on attitudes toward tolerance are now available, the process of theory development and measure construction has been slow and uneven.

This article will consider only one of these problems; based on a survey of the members and leaders of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and members of Common Cause, it explores problems in conceptualizing and measuring political tolerance. New measures are proposed which rely heavily on posing questions within a context of value conflict. Since reactions to actual civil-liberties disputes invariably involve the assignment of weights and priorities to multiple competing values, political tolerance is considered as a multidimensional syndrome of beliefs and values. By specifying a context while measuring political tolerance, and by disaggregating the components of the concept, the way is cleared for a much more sophisticated understanding of the causes and consequences of citizen and regime intolerance.

Conceptual and Operational Approaches to Political Tolerance

As typically defined by social scientists, political tolerance refers to a willingness to extend the rights of citizenship to all members of the polity—that is, to allow political freedoms to those who are politically different. For instance, to Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, “tolerance implies a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things that one rejects. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes. A tolerant regime, then, like a tolerant individual, is one that allows a wide berth to those ideas that challenge its way of life...” (1979, p. 784). Others define tolerance similarly (e.g., Prothro and Grigg 1960).

But what types of activity must be given “wide berth”? The earliest effort to measure political tolerance focused not only on the rights of speech and assembly (“making a speech in your community”), but also on such rights as that not to be excluded on the basis of one’s political affiliations from having one’s book in a library, from working as a singer or entertainer, from teaching in a university or high school, or from working in a defense plant (Stouffer 1955). More recent research operationally defines tolerance to include the right to be considered as a candidate for president of the United States, to speak, to hold rallies, to exist as a legal group, to teach in public schools, to be free from wiretaps, and to socialize

with people (live next door, come to dinner, and date daughters and sons) (Sullivan, et al. 1978-79). Others attack the problem more directly by attempting to define democracy. Prothro and Grigg (1960) postulate two essential elements of democracy—majority rule and minority rights, among them the freedom to dissent. Stouffer (1955) focuses upon tolerance for political non-conformists. McClosky (1964, p. 363) identifies a more exhaustive list of key dimensions of democracy: consent; accountability; limited or constitutional government; representation; majority rule, minority rights; freedom of thought, speech, press, and assembly; equality of opportunity; religious toleration; equality before the law; the rights of juridical defense; and individual self-determination over a broad range of personal affairs (see also McClosky and Chong 1980). Thus, a panoply of actions has been identified which must be put up with, but there is remarkably little agreement on what norms must be accepted and what activities must be tolerated.

Moreover, most tolerance researchers (except McClosky) do not offer rigorous conceptualizations or operationalizations of the subdimensions of political tolerance. For instance, support for free speech is a common element in measures of tolerance, but the continuum (support is obviously not a dichotomy) has not been conceptually or operationally specified. Certainly the Stouffer item on free speech cannot be defended as an adequate measure of willingness to protect free speech; at best, it is only a measure of abstract commitment to the freedom. In general, current approaches fail to identify the theoretical subcomponents of the grand concept “political tolerance”; instead of treating tolerance as a syndrome of attitudes, a belief system, it is typically treated as a single unidimensional attitude.

Our research deviates from previous work by attempting to specify rigorously the relevant subdimensions of political tolerance. Rather than offer an exhaustive definition of tolerance (one that would be incapable of satisfying a very large proportion of scholars), we focus upon support for institutional guarantees for political opposition. Specifically, political tolerance is opposition to state actions that limit opportunities for citizens, individually or in groups, to compete for political power (cf. Dahl 1970). Opportunity for political opposition includes the right to vote, to participate in political parties, and to organize politically. Also necessary are opportunities to engage in political persuasion—for example, to speak and to assemble. Treating tolerance in this way gives the concept obvious relevance for the competition and contestation necessary to democratic regimes (Dahl 1970). Although support for other norms may be necessary in order

for democracies to exist, and certainly other norms help it to flourish, rights of political opposition are consensually recognized as the *sine qua non* of the democratic style of political organization.

But recognition of rights of political opposition as an essential element of political tolerance does not resolve all operational and conceptual problems. Just which activities must be protected in order to insure that the political minority has an opportunity to become a political majority, and how are the relevant continua to be specified? At the abstract level, all would agree that freedom of speech is fairly important to democratic polities; but exactly what sorts of activity must be protected, for instance, by freedom of speech?

The research literature provides few clues to answering this question as it has been more concerned with the types of groups speaking than the types of speech spoken. Typically, political tolerance has been measured by asking subjects whether unpopular (presumed or ascertained) minority political groups should be allowed to make speeches. In the absence of any specification of the content of the speech, the variance in these items is no doubt overwhelmed by affective attitudes toward the group. To ask whether a communist should be allowed to speak evokes responses much too strongly confounded by the wide variety of expectations and evaluation of what communists typically say in their speeches. Moreover, this approach leads to the mistaken impression that the public would support a universal ban on communists' speeches, rather than the more realistic possibility that it would limit certain types of speeches, regardless of the affiliation of the speaker. Although the efforts of Sullivan and others to develop measures that control group affect are certainly necessary, they do not resolve the more fundamental problem of developing and calibrating scales of activity.

Valid measures of support for civil-liberties activity must also specify a meaningful context in which the liberty is to be exercised. When context is not specified, the stimulus is too vague to carry a common meaning for respondents. For instance, Lawrence asked subjects to consider whether or not "people should be allowed to hold a peaceful demonstration to ask the government to act on some issue" (Lawrence 1976, p. 92). Rather than describing a range of circumstances under which demonstrations might occur, this item leaves it to the respondent to survey all possible scenarios and to conclude that demonstrations should "always," "sometimes," or "never" be allowed. This is a demanding task. It is not surprising that when a series of more concrete circumstances was put to the subjects, substantial slippage occurred. Nearly one-fourth of those

responding "always" would prohibit a demonstration in favor of open housing; over a third of the "never" responses would allow demonstrations against pollution! What is the cause of this inconsistency? Subjects simply failed in their efforts to scrutinize comprehensively the domain of possibilities. Since such a task requires substantial thought (and Lawrence did observe a relationship between education and consistency), and since the greater the amount of thought given, the greater the likelihood of a "sometimes" response, a preferable approach is to have the analyst rather than the respondent specify, and thereby control, the contextual domain. Like attitudes toward groups, better control of attitudes toward activities must be achieved.

Moreover, it must be recognized that the exercise of civil liberties generates conflict among values. Democracy may require free speech, but it also requires at least some social order, for instance, and the various requisites of democracy must be balanced. As the substantial gap between responses to abstract and concrete questionnaire items suggests, the exercise of most important civil liberties is a conflictual, zero-sum activity. In heterogeneous societies, the exercise of liberty by one group is usually costly to others. The history of disputes over freedom of speech in the United States vividly illustrates the highly conflictual, not infrequently violent, context of the exercise of rights. Attempts have been made to deny speech because it is too costly to those who abhor violence (*Terminiello v. City of Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)); dislike obscenity or profanity (*Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)); respect the authority of schools over students (*Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District*, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)); believe in the legitimacy of war (*United States v. O'Brien*, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)); are members of minority groups (*Beauharnais v. Illinois*, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)); and who have a strong attachment to the political status quo. Speech rarely occurs in a value vacuum; the exercise of rights generates costs, and these costs are sometimes so substantial that conflict ensues. Thus, inquiries about "a speech in my community" are inadequate because they fail to provide respondents with information about the type of value conflict created within the particular context.

Thus, political tolerance is not itself an attitude, but instead is a hypothetical construct that characterizes the priorities assigned in the instance of value conflict. One who values the right to free assembly more heavily than social order will give responses to questionnaire items which are designated as "tolerant." The necessity of value conflict is recognized by those requiring that their measures of tolerance be directed toward

disfavored objects, but the value conflict must be sharpened considerably (and thereby controlled) by posing less obtuse "context-controlled" stimuli. The hierarchical structure of the subjects' beliefs is revealed through a series of concrete items posing value conflicts.

One context-sensitive approach to political tolerance might be to elicit opinions through detailed scenarios of civil-liberties disputes. Such an approach, however, makes it very difficult to disentangle the many beliefs that contribute to the subject's opinion. A more useful approach is to disaggregate the various values involved in civil liberties conflicts and to attempt to measure each with a context-sensitive measure; that is, the major components of tolerance must be rigorously and independently measured, and consideration must be given to the nature of the interrelationships among the components.

This research identifies several specific conceptual dimensions of political tolerance—dimensions suggested by Dahl's polyarchy concept—and then considers empirically how these dimensions are interrelated. Specifically, tolerance for public political opposition is postulated to be composed of support for the following values:

1. Freedom of speech: the breadth of types of speech given legal and constitutional protection.
2. Freedom of assembly: (a) willingness to risk violent confrontations in order to insure demonstrators access to public places, and (b) willingness to allow nonviolent affronts to communities in order to insure access to public places.
3. Freedom of political association: opposition to government restrictions on and surveillance of minority political groups.

In order to assess the relationship of these measures to more traditional approaches, we have also considered the generalized measures of Stouffer and the omnibus measures of McClosky and his colleagues.

Research Design

In considering the various dimensions of political tolerance, we rely on data collected as part of a study of the conflict in Skokie, Illinois, over the right of members of the Nazi party to hold demonstrations. The data are drawn from a survey of the membership of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the leadership of ACLU, and the membership of Common Cause. Questionnaires were mailed to a sample of approximately 15,000 ACLU members, the entire membership of the boards of directors of the state affiliates of ACLU (approximately 1,600), and a

sample of more than 3,000 Common Cause members.¹

These subjects are well suited to the purpose of this research, which is the development of disaggregated, contextual measures of political tolerance. As a segment of the political elite,² these subjects are more likely than members of the mass public to have meaningful, structured civil-liberties belief systems, a decided advantage to research aimed at understanding the nature of the interrelatedness of beliefs. Indeed, the ACLU samples most likely represent a limiting case, since one would not expect to find another group in the United States with more articulated beliefs about civil liberties. Although the ACLU samples represent the extreme case, the Common Cause sample

¹The sampling and mailings varied greatly in complexity and, because of certain aberrations, we have included a methodological appendix on the sampling.

²Previous research is ambivalent about which segment of society is the "carrier of the creed." Classically, elites have been identified as those holding positions of political, economic, or social leadership (e.g., Stouffer 1955; McClosky 1964; Nunn et al. 1978). Others have used socioeconomic status, and most particularly level of education, as an indicator of elite status (e.g., Prothro and Grigg 1960). Although we have no data on the issue, we doubt that members of ACLU and Common Cause are elites in the classical sense, although members of the ACLU state boards of directors are at least as "elite" as Stouffer's regents of the Daughters of the American Revolution. However, in socioeconomic terms, members of these groups are clearly elites, and in participatory terms they are clearly activists. Only 6 percent of the ACLU members, 9 percent of the Common Cause members, and 4 percent of the ACLU leaders have only a high school diploma or less, and large proportions of each group have at least some graduate-level college training (43, 37, and 48 percent for the three groups). Three-fourths of the ACLU members and leaders and two-thirds of the Common Cause members hold professional or technical positions. Simply as members of a "political club or organization," ACLU and Common Cause members are engaging in a form of political behavior which is quite rare in the United States; only 8 percent of the public claims membership in such a group (Verba and Nie 1972). Most members of both organizations participate in organizational affairs beyond mere dues paying. In terms of political activity, 66 percent of the ACLU members, 40 percent of the Common Cause members, and 85 percent of the ACLU leaders have participated in a demonstration. (In comparison, the 1973 General Social Survey reports that 9.5 percent of the mass public has picketed for a labor strike; 4.3 percent has participated in a civil-rights demonstration; 4.9 percent in an antiwar demonstration; 0.4 percent in a prowar demonstration; and 5.3 percent in a school-related demonstration.) Thus, in terms of the resources and motivations necessary for political influence, these subjects are much more similar to elites than to masses.

is more typical of the liberal elite in the United States, and therefore provides an interesting comparison to the ACLU samples. (Anticipating the findings, however, the ACLU and Common Cause samples differ somewhat in their univariate frequencies but very little in the structure of their beliefs.) Even though we are not entitled to claim that the conclusions from the analysis of these data are generalizable to other elites or to the public, data on members of these two important groups are intrinsically interesting, and the conceptual position argued and the measures developed are certainly susceptible to use in future research on political tolerance in other contexts.

Measures of Political Tolerance

Support for Freedom of Speech. Stouffer used a single question: "Should a _____ be allowed to speak in your community?" to measure support for freedom of speech. Obviously such an item encompasses a wide variety of circumstances surrounding speeches, circumstances that are completely uncontrolled. In order to impose this control, it is necessary to specify a freedom of speech continuum which is independent of any particular group and which reflects the sort of value conflict typically observed in free-speech disputes.

As simple as the proscription, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech...." appears at first consideration, the controversies generated in the exercise of free speech in a pluralistic society are many and complex. Although any free speech continuum may be multidimensional, it is useful to consider support for freedom of speech as the willingness to extend protection to various types of speech which evoke conflicts in values. Thus, unlike those who measure support for free speech in terms of the group seeking to speak, we seek to identify a continuum based on types of speech.³ Further, the items are phrased specifically in terms of state constitutional policy on the various types of speech, not the respondent's own preference. Using actual controversies as a guide to calibrating the scale, the subjects were asked whether or not

several types of speech should be constitutionally protected.

Table 1 shows that the level of tolerance for different types of speech varies dramatically depending upon its content. Very few would prohibit speech "extremely critical of the American system of government," but not many would allow speech "designed to incite an audience to violence." Support for freedom of speech declines substantially as the speech becomes more threatening to the existing political system, and as the implication for action increases, although it is speech, not action itself, to which the items refer. A large majority of respondents would not protect speech designed to incite an audience to violence, although the intent of the speaker does have considerable impact on the willingness of the subjects to protect the speech. Overall, however, there are very few types of speech that are universally supported by members of ACLU and Common Cause.

These items were subjected to Guttman Scaling in order to determine if a single underlying dimension could account for the responses. The Guttman scale analysis⁴ of the nine items suggests very marginal scalability but also aids in identifying items that are weakly related to the primary construct. Responses on symbolic speech and obscene speech account for a major portion of the errors in the scale. Many subjects seem to feel that obscene speech should be evaluated differently from other, more politically relevant types of speech. The item soliciting opinion on symbolic speech may be too concrete to serve as a reliable measure; that is, the draft card example (from *United States v. O'Brien*), an extreme instance of symbolic speech, may have unduly influenced the responses. Consequently, the variance in the responses to those two items is contaminated by additional dimensions, resulting in the poor scalability coefficients. When these two items are removed, the results are much improved. The coefficients of scalability for the seven-item scale for ACLU members are .61; for ACLU leaders, .81; and for Common Cause members, .68. The nine-item coefficients are .45, .64, and .51, for the three groups. Further, factor analysis of the nine questions produced markedly lower communalities for these two items. Therefore, the

³Although there may be some overlap between the type of speaker and the speech, our strategy results in a measure with little contamination from group affect, because we assume that it makes little difference which group is calling for the violent overthrow of the government. Thus, although not group controlled, the measure is probably group-neutral. Yet the items are certainly not abstract, because they specify clearly the content of the speech.

⁴Several different scaling techniques are used in this study, reflecting the varying substantive needs of scale construction. For instance, Guttman Scaling was used on the free speech items because cumulativeness (rather than covariance) is the sort of constraint reflected in the relationships of the stimuli. For many of the other scales, covariation is adequate to suggest the existence of some underlying, organizing attitude.

Table 1. Support for Freedom of Speech*

Type of speech	Should this type of speech be protected by the First Amendment?				
	Definitely	Probably	Probably not	Definitely not	No opinion
Speech extremely critical of the American system of government	%	%	%	%	%
ACLU members	84.3	12.0	1.8	1.5	0.4
ACLU leaders	95.5	4.2	0.2	0	0.2
Common Cause members	65.2	22.2	6.4	5.8	0.4
Speech extremely critical of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution					
ACLU members	77.4	16.0	3.0	2.6	1.1
ACLU leaders	92.8	6.5	0.3	0.2	0.2
Common Cause members	60.8	23.8	6.7	7.6	1.1
Symbolic speech, such as burning one's draft card in protest of the war in Vietnam					
ACLU members	71.3	17.2	6.2	3.5	1.7
ACLU leaders	87.3	9.1	2.8	0.1	0.8
Common Cause members	52.9	24.3	10.5	9.9	2.3
Speech extremely critical of particular minority groups					
ACLU members	61.3	25.1	7.6	5.3	0.7
ACLU leaders	84.6	13.6	0.8	0.8	0.2
Common Cause members	47.1	29.7	12.2	10.4	0.6
Speech supportive of an enemy of the U.S.					
ACLU members	52.0	31.6	8.4	5.3	2.7
ACLU leaders	79.0	17.2	2.1	0.7	1.0
Common Cause members	33.2	33.3	16.4	14.9	2.3
Obscene or profane speech					
ACLU members	43.6	30.5	15.9	7.0	3.0
ACLU leaders	69.6	21.2	5.5	2.0	1.7
Common Cause members	26.1	27.2	21.9	22.1	2.7
Speech advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government					
ACLU members	48.3	26.2	12.9	10.9	1.7
ACLU leaders	76.8	15.2	4.6	2.9	0.4
Common Cause members	29.2	23.4	17.4	29.2	0.9
Speech that <i>might</i> incite an audience to violence					
ACLU members	27.1	34.0	26.6	10.0	2.3
ACLU leaders	50.2	31.3	13.3	4.0	1.3
Common Cause members	13.0	25.8	35.9	22.9	2.4
Speech <i>designed</i> to incite an audience to violence					
ACLU members	9.8	10.4	29.8	48.1	1.9
ACLU leaders	21.5	16.5	27.6	31.9	2.6
Common Cause members	7.6	6.7	19.7	65.0	1.0

*The question read: "Different people have different ideas about what kinds of speech should be protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. We are interested in getting your opinion about whether particular types of speech should be protected under the First Amendment. For each of the following types of speech, please indicate whether you believe it should definitely be protected, probably be protected, probably not be protected, or definitely not be protected by the First Amendment. That is, please mark the blank which comes closest to your opinion for each of the following types of speech."

symbolic and obscene speech items were excluded from further analysis.⁵

It is obvious that support for freedom of speech varies considerably depending upon the type of speech, causing one to wonder what causes reactions to the possibility of "communists making a speech." Is there an anticipation that the communists would "incite an audience to violence" or that they might advocate "the overthrow of the U.S. Government?" The responses of ACLU and Common Cause members suggest that great differences in the frequencies would be observed depending upon which of these two types of speech is anticipated. (Note also that over 90 percent of these subjects respond tolerantly to the Stouffer free-speech item for communists.) We cannot, of course, know the specific type of speech imagined, but it seems likely that variability in responses to these items is a function of a concrete scenario manufactured by the subjects immediately before their responses. This does not mean that the responses are abstract; rather, they are too variable in specific content to be useful. This new scale controls the content much more rigorously.

Support for Freedom of Assembly. Conflict over freedom of speech typically involves freedom of assembly issues. If Stouffer's communists were to make a private speech, there would probably be little objection. Difficulties arise when unpopular minority political groups seek access to streets and other public property in order to express their views. It is therefore essential that support for free assembly attitudes be considered as an explicit subdimension of political tolerance.

Beyond the problem of "regulation" of assemblies, two rationales are sometimes advanced to justify prohibition of public demonstrations. The first is the proposition that a substantial threat of an assembly becoming violent justifies the prohibition of the demonstration. (Most would agree that demonstrators seeking access to public property for the purpose of violent activity can be legitimately denied such access.) Public safety and order should not be threatened by demonstrations; the First Amendment guarantees only "the right of the people peaceably to assemble."

Yet even the question of violence is not as simple as it may seem. Most public demonstrations present some possibility of violence. And what of violence perpetrated against, not by, the

demonstrators? Fear of violence from a hostile crowd—if allowed to serve as a justification for prohibiting assemblies—could effectively eliminate many public demonstrations. Thus, the problem of the heckler's veto is an extremely important component of support for freedom of assembly.

A second important element of free assembly concerns the location of the demonstration. Most would agree that the state can regulate demonstrations, but can communities prohibit demonstrations by groups solely because the majority considers them abhorrent? Is there a community right to privacy that transcends the right to assemble? Must the nonviolent harm done to a community by a demonstration be subordinated to the right to assemble? These questions are of obvious importance, given the publicity gains that flow from marching through enemy territory. Failure to support assemblies because of tension between community and group ideology is a very substantial limitation on the rights of minority political groups.

An effort has been made to measure attitudes on these two dimensions of freedom of assembly. Table 2 reports the item measuring support for the heckler's veto. The stem of the question deliberately attributes the threat of violence to the crowd, not to the demonstrators.⁶ Nevertheless, substantial proportions of ACLU and Common Cause members are willing to stop the demonstration at the first sign of actual violence (a rock is thrown), whereas nearly one-half of the Common Cause members would stop the assembly before any violence occurred. The leaders of ACLU are unwilling to allow the demonstration to be ended short of a riot. Thus, although there may be substantial support for freedom of assembly in the abstract, the freedom is for many subordinate to the value of public order.

In order to measure support for the local community's right to prohibit access to its streets to those expressing abhorrent views, the subjects were asked to evaluate four scenarios (see Table 3). The most acceptable of the situations involves the request of a black civil-rights group to march in a white southern community: large majorities of all three of the groups would support the issuance of a permit to demonstrate. Somewhat less support exists for permits for members of the Palestine Liberation Organization to demonstrate in a Jewish community and for Nazis to demonstrate in a white Protestant community. The most difficult scenario is that of Ku Klux

⁵Guttman Scale scores were assigned to the respondents. The score is the rank of the most difficult approved item. If a "definitely should be protected" response was given to the item, .5 was added to the scale score.

⁶The construction of this item relies heavily on *Edwards vs. South Carolina* (372 U.S. 229) and Walker (1978).

Table 2. Support for Freedom of Assembly: Heckler's Veto*

The police should be allowed to stop the demonstration when	ACLU members %	ACLU leaders %	Common Cause members %
a crowd begins to form.	0.5	0	1.5
members of the crowd begin to taunt the group.	1.9	0.7	6.0
the crowd appears to be on the verge of a violent reaction.	22.6	6.8	36.8
a member of the crowd picks up a rock.	3.9	2.8	4.3
a rock is thrown in the direction of the demonstrators.	11.1	8.3	10.4
the demonstrators begin to fight with the crowd.	36.8	36.5	27.2
The police should not be allowed to stop the demonstration.	21.2	47.0	12.1
No opinion	2.0	1.1	1.7

*The question read: "Many public demonstrations pose a threat of violent reactions from crowds. Consider a demonstration that is itself peaceful, but which attracts a hostile crowd. Should the police be allowed to stop the demonstration in order to avoid violent crowd reactions? If so, at what point should the demonstration be stopped?"

Table 3. Support for Freedom of Assembly: Majority Abhorrence

	Strongly support %	Support %	Oppose %	Strongly oppose %	No opinion %
What if a black civil-rights group asked to be allowed to hold a march in a white southern community—would you oppose or support granting a permit?					
ACLU members	58.0	36.6	3.4	0.9	1.1
ACLU leaders	82.9	15.2	1.0	0.6	0.4
Common Cause members	38.9	47.7	8.5	2.2	2.6
Suppose the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) sought to march in a Jewish community. Should a permit be granted?					
ACLU members	39.6	42.5	10.1	5.6	2.1
ACLU leaders	70.0	25.0	2.2	1.8	0.9
Common Cause members	21.3	41.9	21.9	11.4	3.5
Should the Ku Klux Klan be granted a permit to march in a black community?					
ACLU members	36.2	40.2	13.3	8.7	1.5
ACLU leaders	67.8	26.6	3.1	2.1	0.4
Common Cause members	18.9	38.0	24.7	15.7	2.7
What if the Nazis asked to be allowed to hold a march in a white Protestant community? Would you support or oppose granting a permit in such a circumstance?					
ACLU members	38.0	45.3	9.1	4.9	2.6
ACLU leaders	69.8	26.7	1.7	1.3	0.6
Common Cause members	20.0	45.6	19.0	11.2	4.1

Klansmen marching in a black community. As we have consistently observed, the ACLU leadership is consensual in supporting the assembly rights of these unpopular groups. A large majority of the ACLU membership and a slight majority of the Common Cause membership hold similar libertarian attitudes. Generally, though, the context of the demonstration has some impact upon support for freedom of assembly.⁷

⁷An index has been created that measures the intensity as well as the substance of beliefs on these four items. The index was computed by counting the number of instances in which the subject would allow a demonstration, multiplying this score by 2, adding .5 to the score for each "strong" support for the demonstrators, and subtracting .5 for each "strong" opposition. Thus, the index varies from -2.0 (four responses of "strongly oppose") to 10 (four responses of "strongly support"). It might also be noted that these four items scale in the Guttman sense.

Political Association and Government Oppression. A slightly different approach to tolerance is one that emphasizes the freedom to engage in political activity without the interference of the government. Members of the Socialist Worker's Party may be allowed to hold public demonstrations, but if their offices are regularly burglarized by the federal government, then its oppositionist rights are "chilled" (to say the least). Citizens may be willing to support certain freedoms for groups while at the same time supporting government action against the group and its members.

In order to measure support for government action against unpopular political minorities, the subjects were asked to express support or opposition to six types of government oppression of Communists, Nazis, and members of the Ku Klux Klan. Responses to the items are shown in Table 4.

Something approaching unanimity on each individual item is observed among members of the ACLU. Very little support exists for oppression of

Table 4. Support for Government Repression

	Percentage Supporting Restriction* on		
	Communists	Nazis	Klansmen
Outlaw organized party			
ACLU members	1.7	6.0	7.0
ACLU leaders	0.4	1.3	2.0
Common Cause members	6.6	15.8	14.8
Prohibit members from running for office			
ACLU members	2.2	6.4	6.2
ACLU leaders	0.5	1.3	1.0
Common Cause members	9.3	17.0	14.2
Covert surveillance			
ACLU members	6.9	9.1	9.4
ACLU leaders	2.0	2.6	3.0
Common Cause members	21.9	24.1	22.1
Governmental registration			
ACLU members	7.4	9.4	8.8
ACLU leaders	2.1	2.6	2.5
Common Cause members	29.8	31.8	27.6
Ban public activities			
ACLU members	1.5	6.9	8.3
ACLU leaders	0.1	1.6	1.6
Common Cause members	6.3	16.1	17.0
Ban display of symbols			
ACLU members	3.1	9.4	12.0
ACLU leaders	0.5	1.5	2.7
Common Cause members	8.4	22.2	24.8
Favor no repressive acts			
ACLU members	84.7	75.9	74.5
ACLU leaders	95.6	93.8	92.9
Common Cause members	55.9	46.9	47.6

*Respondents were asked to indicate all of the actions they would favor the government taking against these groups (e.g., favor outlawing any organized communist party).

the groups, although one-fourth of the ACLU members support some form of government action against some groups. The greatest support is for banning the public display of the symbols of the Nazis (swastika) and of the Klan (burning cross), and registration and covert surveillance (e.g., wiretapping) of these two groups. Members of Common Cause are not nearly so united, however. Substantial minorities support registration, covert surveillance, and a ban on swastikas. Common Cause members are more likely to support the oppression of Communists than are members of ACLU. Although support for any particular repressive governmental policy falls far short of a majority, one-quarter of the ACLU members and one-half of the Common Cause membership would support some sort of repression against some political minority. Only ACLU leaders consensually reject such action.

These items tap a somewhat different dimension of tolerance in that they refer to support for a more activist posture against political minorities on the part of the government. Rather than simply rejecting efforts at exercising political rights by minorities (e.g., speaking), these items go more directly to willingness to challenge the very existence of opposition groups. This is obviously a more menacing form of intolerance than intolerance of assemblies and speeches.⁸

⁸Scale scores were assigned to each subject by means of factor analysis. In order to reduce the number of items subjected to the factor analysis, nine small indices were first created. The eighteen items represent three groups and six activities. An activity-based measure was created for each of the six actions by summing across the three groups. This results, for example, in an index of support for banning unpopular political groups, which varies from 0 to 3. Similarly, three group-based measures were created by summing for each group across the six actions. The advantage of such a method is that relatively idiosyncratic opinions on a particular item are reduced in importance and the scaling results are consequently cleaner.

The factor analyses have been conducted on the complete pool of subjects (i.e., not differentiated by group). For some of the indices, the problem of whether to do the scaling analysis separately for the three groups does not arise. For instance, the measure of support for the heckler's veto requires no separate analysis for ACLU members, leaders, and Common Cause members. However, on most measures it is necessary to consider whether the scale is appropriate for the three groups. This is not simply a problem of varying levels of tolerance within the three groups; rather, it stems from the possibility that members of the different groups may perceive issues and reality differently, and therefore that they differ in the nature of the interrelations among the item or beliefs. It would not be unusual, for instance, for members of ACLU to have more structured beliefs

Miscellaneous Civil Liberties. The discussion to this point has focused on support for opposition rights (speech, assembly, and association) as indicators of political tolerance. Although these rights are essential to political communication and opposition, tolerance traditionally has been considered to be broader in scope. Stouffer recognized this in posing the question of support for eclectic public library collections, and others (notably McClosky) have not confined their measures of tolerance to attitudes toward assembly, speech, and association. In order to consider the relationships of tolerance, defined in terms of speech, assembly, and association, to the more diffuse approach to tolerance, the subjects were asked to express agreement or disagreement with fourteen items representing a variety of civil-liberties conflicts. Most of these items are grounded in freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.⁹ The responses are shown in Table 5.

Several aspects of these data are noteworthy. First, only ACLU leaders approach consensus in their responses. A number of issues generate a nonnegligible antilibertarian minority within the ACLU membership. Common Cause members are even more split by these issues. Although these subjects are no doubt more supportive of civil liberties than the general public, dissensus still exists.

The data also suggest the types of issues likely to generate conflict over civil liberties. The problem of the Eighth Amendment and the death penalty; the definition of separateness in church-state relations; and the issue of the rights of conservatives and racists all are issues that fail to evoke overwhelming libertarian majorities.

The 14 items in Table 5 were subjected to a factor analysis in order to assess their dimensionality. The solution from common factor analysis with oblique biquartimin rotation is shown in Table

about civil liberties issues than members of Common Cause. This of course means that an analysis of all subjects would obscure important differences among the groups.

In order to deal with this problem, each of the scales was analyzed on the total number of respondents *and* on the three groups separately. In some instances slight differences among the groups were observed (e.g., the miscellaneous civil liberties items), but these differences were never sufficient to justify separate analysis.

⁹The source for most of these items is the ACLU pamphlet "Where Do You Stand on Civil Liberties?" The exception is the item on the elimination of the tax-exemption for churches. The pamphlet presents a test that ACLU encourages prospective members to take. ACLU asserts that those scoring 75 percent or better are likely to be satisfied members.

Table 5. Miscellaneous Civil Liberties

	Agree/ Disagree	Percent "Libertarian"		
		ACLU members	ACLU leaders	Common Cause members
		%	%	%
High school students are within their rights when they express political opinions, circulate petitions and handbills, or wear political insignia in school.	A	94.5	97.6	87.9
A woman has a private right to decide whether to have a child or undergo an abortion.	A	93.8	94.6	89.3
Police should be allowed to conduct a full search of any motorist arrested for an offense such as speeding.	D	92.6	97.1	78.6
A man should be denied unemployment compensation if fired from his job for growing a beard.	D	91.6	95.4	87.0
Court calendars are so crowded that the right to trial by jury should be restricted to persons accused of major crimes only.	D	87.0	94.5	74.5
Students who shout down speakers to achieve their aims subvert the principles of academic freedom.	D	86.2	87.4	90.1
The C.I.A. should be able to prevent any former employees from writing about the agency without the C.I.A.'s prior approval.	D	82.4	92.8	67.1
Government consolidation of dossiers on individual citizens violates the right to privacy.	A	81.5	86.7	73.5
A radio station which permits the reading of an anti-Semitic poem over the air should have its F.C.C. license revoked.	D	80.1	88.2	69.4
In their fight against crime the police should be entitled to use wiretaps and other devices for listening in on private conversations.	D	78.9	89.1	63.8
Membership in the John Birch Society by itself is enough to bar an applicant from appointment to the police force.	D	78.5	90.0	67.2
The use of tax funds to support parochial schools involves compulsory taxation for religious purposes and thus violates the First Amendment.	A	77.2	87.9	74.1
In light of present standards of justice and humanity, the death penalty has become "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.	A	69.8	88.2	52.5
The "separation of church and state" clause of the First Amendment should be used to eliminate the tax-exempt status of religious institutions.	A	54.0	59.6	49.0

6.¹⁰ Three relatively distinct factors emerge from the analysis. The first rotated factor is strongly dominated by items relating to police and the order and security of society. Most of the items specifically concern the tension between order and liberty, a tension focused on the degree of legitimate intrusiveness of order-maintenance forces. The two items with relatively small coefficients—concerning high school students and unemployment compensation—probably are related to social order through their implication of

nonconformity. In general, the first factor seems to measure the degree of support for constraints on liberty for the purpose of maintaining order.

The second factor is also easily interpreted. The two strongly related items refer to liberties of the political right. The final factor is primarily related to religious freedom and separation of church and state. Abortion may be related to this factor because it is seen as an issue with connotations of religious freedom.

Scores of the three factors are fairly strongly interrelated, which suggests that the responses to the items stem from a common attitude or belief. Rather than performing a higher order factor analysis on the three factor scores, however, the interrelatedness of various beliefs will be considered below.

¹⁰Orthogonal rotation was inappropriate, as no a priori assumption about the independence of possible subdimensions was warranted.

Stouffer's Measure of Tolerance. In order to explore the relationship of these measures to the typical Stouffer items, questions measuring tolerance for four types of activity by five minority political groups were included in the questionnaire. Instead of the two-stage Guttman Scaling process used by Stouffer and others (see Nunn et al. 1978, pp. 180-85), we have developed a somewhat more sophisticated method for creating an index. First, a generalized group-based measure of tolerance was created. Five group-specific indices were computed by summing the

tolerant responses for each group across the four different activities. Second, an activity-based measure of tolerance was created by summing tolerant responses for activities across groups. Thus, the original pool of 20 items was reduced to 9 indices measuring support for the civil liberties of unpopular political groups and for these political activities. Descriptive data are shown in Table 7.

These indices were also subjected to factor analysis. The analysis clearly indicates a unidimensional structure (and as such, no rota-

Table 6. Common Factor Analysis of Miscellaneous Civil Liberties Items

Item	Pattern Factor Loading (Oblique Rotation ^a)		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
In their fight against crime the police should be entitled to use wiretaps and other devices for listening in on private conversations.	.80 ^b		
The C.I.A. should be able to prevent any former employees from writing about the agency without the C.I.A.'s prior approval.	.70		
Government consolidation of dossiers on individual citizens violates the right of privacy.	.64		
In light of present standards of justice and humanity, the death penalty has become "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.	.62		
Police should be allowed to conduct a full search of any motorist arrested for an offense such as speeding.	.62		
A man should be denied unemployment compensation if fired from his job for growing a beard.	(.37)		
High school students are within their rights when they express political opinions, circulate petitions and handbills, or wear insignia in school.	(.37)		
Membership in the John Birch Society by itself is enough to bar an applicant from appointment to the police forces.		-.76	
A radio station that permits the reading of an anti-Semitic poem over the air should have its F.C.C. license revoked.		-.63	
Court calendars are so crowded that the right to trial by jury should be restricted to persons accused of major crimes only.		(-.36)	
The use of tax funds to support parochial schools involves compulsory taxation for religious purposes and thus violates the First Amendment.			.72
The "separation of church and state" clause of the First Amendment should be used to eliminate the tax-exempt status of religious institutions.			.53
A woman has a private right to decide whether to have a child or undergo an abortion.			.46
Students who shout down speakers to achieve their aims subvert the principles of academic freedom.			(.26)
Eigenvalue (unrotated solution) ^c	3.36	1.54	1.31
Percentage of variance explained	24.0	11.0	9.4

^aOblique, biqurtimin rotation. The correlations of the factors are: $r_{12} = -.56$; $r_{13} = .53$; $r_{23} = -.53$.

^bLoadings are pattern loadings. Only loadings greater than or equal to .4 are shown (except when the maximum coefficient for an item is less than .4). Items have been reflected where necessary so that low scores always indicate support for the liberty.

^cThe eigenvalue of the fourth factor is .98.

Table 7. Tolerance as Measured by Stouffer Items

	Percentage "Perfectly" Tolerant		
	ACLU members	ACLU leaders	Common Cause members
Group-based tolerance			
Atheists	85.3	95.4	66.1
Communists	79.6	72.4	52.0
Militarists	71.6	87.1	49.1
Nazis	68.2	87.5	46.2
Klansmen	63.5	83.3	43.2
Activity-based tolerance^a			
Speaking	88.6	97.8	76.4
Publishing	88.4	92.9	79.9
Demonstrating	70.1	91.2	51.4
Teaching	65.1	65.4	40.8

^aFor each group, four activities were considered:

"If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community against/in favor of _____, should he/she be allowed to speak?"

"Should such a person be allowed to organize a march against/in favor of _____ in your community?"

"Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university?"

"If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote against/in favor of _____ should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing the book?"

tion was performed) with a single, strongly dominant factor. The items contribute approximately equally to the factor, with a slightly smaller contribution from the index of opposition to censorship of library books. Generally, the responses to the items are dominated by a single attitude.

The Interrelatedness of Civil Liberties Beliefs. Eight dimensions of political tolerance have been measured: (1) willingness to extend constitutional protection to threatening speech; (2) opposition to the heckler's veto; (3) willingness to allow demonstrations by groups abhorrent to the community; (4) opposition to government oppression; (5) support for liberty versus social order; (6) support for the rights of the right; (7) support for separation of church and state; and (8) general political tolerance. These various beliefs are conceptually interrelated, and it is therefore fruitful to consider their empirical relationships.

Several interesting findings can be noted from the correlation matrix of these eight variables (see Table 8).¹¹ First, attitudes toward speech,

¹¹As revealed by separate factor analyses, the structure of beliefs is very similar for ACLU members, leaders, and Common Cause members. The correlation matrices for the ACLU leaders are very similar, although in general the restricted variation in their responses attenuates the coefficients slightly. The similarity between Common Cause and ACLU members in the way beliefs are related to each other is somewhat surprising, as it was expected that ACLU members would exhibit more evidence of ideological ordering of beliefs than Common Cause members. Generally, the

assembly, and political association are moderately interrelated. Those favoring the protection of many types of speech tend to be willing to support demonstrations despite community opposition ($r = .45$), or the threat of violence ($r = .42$). However, the largest observed correlation among these four measures is only $-.56$ (abhorrent demonstrations—government oppression), suggesting that although these attitudes may belong to a common belief system, they are empirically distinct. Even the two measures of assembly attitudes are not strongly correlated ($r = .40$). The absence of stronger correlations suggests that conflict may be seen among the various rights of political opposition—some of those strongly supporting freedom of speech would limit access to a public forum in order to make that speech (a position reminiscent of the opinions of Justice Hugo Black). At a minimum, these items do not tap identical attitudes. Political tolerance is a syndrome of attitudes; beliefs on various dimensions of the concept are distinguishable even among elites.

The scale based on the Stouffer items (general tolerance) performs surprisingly well. It is at least moderately related to all of the other measures except church and state attitudes. However, the correlation between the Stouffer items and support for freedom of speech is only $.48$, although the

three groups can be collapsed in the analysis of the interrelatedness of beliefs.

Stouffer items are more strongly related to community privacy attitudes ($r = .66$) and opposition to political oppression ($r = .67$). (It must be remembered that the Stouffer set of activities was supplemented with a demonstration item—see Table 7.) Regressing the Stouffer scale on the other seven items results in an R^2 of .59, with the major independent contribution being made by attitudes toward government oppression and freedom of assembly. Thus, nearly one-half of the scale's variance cannot be accounted for by the other activity-based measures of tolerance.

The three factor scores from the miscellaneous civil-liberties items are themselves moderately interrelated, but they are not strongly related to the other measures. Attitudes toward church and state correlate very weakly with support of civil liberties, whereas the other two scales are weakly to moderately associated. Generally, these attitudes must be considered distinct components of tolerance.

When the eight variables are subjected to factor analysis (with bi-quartimin rotation), a two-dimensional structure emerges, although the dimensions are very strongly related ($r = .76$). The pattern coefficients demonstrate a second dimension which is composed almost exclusively of the three factors from the miscellaneous civil-liberties items.¹² Although this may be at least partially a methodological artifact, support for rights of political opposition seems to hold a distinct position within civil-liberties belief systems. Since the first unrotated factor accounts

for less than 50 percent of variance among the items, it is reasonable to conclude that these beliefs are all part of a common system, but also that they are empirically distinct.

This analysis suggests that it may be useful to distinguish between two types of civil liberties: rights of political opposition and rights related to freedom from government intervention in certain aspects of the private lives of citizens. Opposition rights are rights to political speech, assembly, and association. These rights frequently conflict with the desire of individuals and communities to be insulated from political conflict and insult. Privacy rights have little to do with political opposition; rather, they represent more individualistic, human rights. Religious freedom, protection against the abuse of discretion by criminal justice authorities, and equal opportunity are illustrative of this rather broad category. Although attitudes toward the two categories of civil liberties are strongly related, they are analytically and empirically distinct.

The measures presented here are context controlled. They focus upon specific activities, use multiple indicators, and present respondents with stimuli that are located on a dimension calibrated by actual civil-liberties conflicts. Attitudes are thus measured by posing circumstances that increase the level of conflict among various values. When little or no conflict is presented (e.g., the Stouffer items), the political tolerance of these respondents is relatively high. As the conflict heightens, tolerance declines predictably. The data presented strongly support the thesis that political tolerance is context sensitive and that context must therefore be controlled.

Discussion

Two issues in the measurement of political tolerance? More precise measurement of civil liberties attitudes is not intrinsically useful; instead, of a context within the operational indicators. At-

¹²It should be noted that as the intercorrelations of factors increases, the differences between pattern and structure coefficients also increase. Neither coefficient is necessarily superior to the other, although pattern coefficients are considered more useful in interpreting factors (cf. Rummel 1970, pp. 339-401). The structure coefficients are in this case quite similar to the coefficients from the unrotated solution.

Table 8. Correlations among Multiple Indicators of Tolerance^a

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. General tolerance (Stouffer)	1.00							
2. Rights of the right	.48	1.00						
3. Abhorrent demonstrations	.66	.46	1.00					
4. Liberty v. order	-.37	-.66	-.37	1.00				
5. Government oppression	-.67	-.43	-.56	.36	1.00			
6. Free speech	.48	.39	.45	-.35	-.42	1.00		
7. Church and state	-.28	-.57	-.29	.63	.22	-.26	1.00	
8. Heckler's veto	.37	.34	.40	-.34	-.34	.38	-.25	1.00

^aCombined ACLU and Common Cause samples.




Figure 1. Relationship of General Beliefs to Specific Action

titudes toward various subdimensions are interrelated but not so strongly as to justify the conclusion that the attitudes are unidimensional. Instead, political tolerance represents a syndrome of beliefs.

But of what utility is this approach to tolerance? More precise measurement of civil liberties attitudes is not intrinsically useful; instead, greater discrimination must be judged useful because it contributes to some generally accepted end. What is that end?

The ultimate justification for research on attitudes is the prediction of behaviors. Most actual conflicts over the civil liberties of minority political groups stimulate several beliefs and varying subdimensions of particular beliefs. When the multidimensionality of political tolerance is recognized, it becomes obvious that a particular dispute may stimulate more than a single civil-liberties attitude. These attitudes may conflict, even though in the abstract there is no logical inconsistency among them, and even though they may be derived from a common source, such as personality attributes. For instance, because support for civil liberties is never absolute, attitude scores for respondents indicate the breadth of

types of speeches which would be granted legal protection and the breadth of types of assemblies which would be legally allowed. Beliefs on these two dimensions may conflict, and more importantly, the context of the dispute—perhaps the identity of the group involved, the content of the speech, the feelings of the local community toward the speakers—interacts with the beliefs (as shown in Figure 1). Like judges deciding cases, citizen reactions to civil-liberty conflicts represent the evaluation of the stimulus or controversy on the continua defining each of the subdimensions of the tolerance belief system, as well as on dimensions independent of tolerance (e.g., social order). If the decisions derived independently from each subdimension are not in conflict, then a position on the issue is easily reached. If conflict exists, then positions represent some process of reconciling the beliefs (either through the reclassification of the stimulus or the direct reconciliation of competing beliefs).

Further, statistical relationships between the generalized political tolerance and specific opinions or actions are likely to be attenuated because of the contextual factors. The context affects the translation of more general and abstract

beliefs into more specific and concrete beliefs and actions. The observed correlation between generalized political tolerance and specific political action thus may not be great, when in fact the causal effect is substantial. We are unclear about precisely how this process works. However, predictions of behavior from a syndrome of attitudes measured by items incorporating context will be much more successful than predictions derived from unidimensional, context-insensitive items.

Substantively, the most surprising finding is the breadth of items on which a not-insignificant intolerant minority exists within these elite interest groups. ACLU leaders are consensual in their support of nearly all of the civil-liberty questions; the ACLU members frequently deviate from consensus; and Common Cause members only infrequently exhibit even a solid majority. Table 7 provides a clear illustration of this finding. It is obvious that members of ACLU are more willing than most to allow dissidents to engage in political activities—and thus they may legitimately be considered carriers of the creed—but there are also clear circumstances in which sizable intolerant minorities emerge. Fear that violence may result as a consequence of the exercise of civil liberties gives pause to some; others are wary of the extension of civil liberties to seriously antisystem groups. But the threat of violence, especially from “outside agitators” and other “antisystem” elements, is an intimate part of struggle over civil liberties. If support for the rights of political opposition is limited to circumstances that minimize the likelihood that the activity will be effective, then political tolerance is suspect. If the maintenance and expansion of civil liberties are indeed contingent upon a strongly united libertarian elite, then these data give rise to concern.

Recent research on attitudes toward civil liberties makes clear the complexity of libertarian attitudes. This research adds an additional component to that complexity in demonstrating the dimensionality of political tolerance. It is of course not surprising that these beliefs are complex; rarely is social and political conflict over civil liberties simple, and beliefs bear some relationship to reality. As more sensitive measures are constructed, progress on more important research questions, such as explaining intolerant political behavior, can then be made.

Appendix

Two completely independent samples were drawn from the ACLU membership. The first sample consisted of approximately 10,000 subjects; the second consisted of 5,000 subjects. The

first sample represented four different strata of approximately 2,000 subjects each:

1. ACLU members who failed to renew their memberships (renewal dates between June 30 and November 30, 1977).
2. Members who responded to a special contribution appeal structured around the Skokie crisis.
3. Members who did not respond to the special appeal.
4. Individuals who joined ACLU for the first time in the period from June 1977 through June 1978.

In addition, the universe of individuals resigning or having their membership terminated in 1977 for any reason, including death, was selected. These subjects were mailed questionnaires in July 1978.

Subsequent to the July mailing it was discovered that the samples were not drawn by a completely random process. Rather than using a truly random procedure, the mailing company that maintained ACLU's membership list at the time selected the first n names that met the stratum criterion. Because the list of members had vestiges of alphabetical order, and since the new members were at the time being added to the end of the membership file, the samples selected were biased toward members with last names beginning with the early letters of the alphabet and (for the new member stratum) who had joined at a particular point in time. Since the amount of bias could not be estimated, a second, truly random sample was selected.

This sample represents people who were active members of June 1977, or who joined ACLU during the period June 1977, through June 1978 ($n \approx 5000$), and the questionnaires were mailed in September 1978. A second copy of the questionnaire was sent in April 1979, to nonrespondents in this second sample, new members from the first sample, and the universe of those writing letters of resignation.

The sample of Common Cause members is much more easily defined. A strictly random sample of approximately 3,000 members of the organization was selected, and questionnaires were mailed in September 1978. Nonrespondents received a follow-up mailing in April 1979.

Calculations of response rates are usually somewhat arbitrary and always result in approximations rather than precise figures. In this research, many of the common problems attending these calculations are exacerbated. For instance, the ACLU and Common Cause membership lists contain institutional members as well as individual members. Worse yet, the ACLU has experienced very considerable difficulty in maintaining its mailing list, resulting in an unknown but no doubt substantial number of incorrect ad-

dresses and deceased members in the membership file. (As the questionnaires were mailed at the third class, nonprofit rate, the Post Office made no attempt to forward the mail.) The sample address lists have been cleaned as much as possible, and response rates calculated on the basis of adjusted denominators. Nevertheless, these figures must still be considered as only very conservative estimates of the true rate.

The response rates for the general membership samples of ACLU and Common Cause are 43 and 47 percent. The higher rate for Common Cause members is unexpected and undoubtedly reflects the difference in the quality and accuracy of the two mailing lists. Further, the ACLU rate is depressed by the oversampling of new members, who responded at a rate of 37 percent, and of members who had previously failed to renew their memberships in the organization (rate = 31 percent). Table A-1 shows the response rates for each of the subsamples.

Table A-1 also demonstrates that the probabilities of selection for the various subsamples were greatly dissimilar. Because the sampling process that selected the first four samples was defective, these subjects must be considered to have had a probability of selection of one. Similarly, the population of resigners was selected so each of them had a probability of selection of one. However, only 3,680 of the approximately 105,000 active members (i.e., omitting those in the process of joining or resigning) in June 1977, were selected, resulting in a probability of selection for each subject of .0350. With such disparate possibilities it is essential that the responses be weighted. Accepted practice (cf. Kish 1965) is to weight by the inverse of the probability of selection.

Although it is difficult at both the conceptual and methodological levels to specify the size of the

ACLU membership, the following assumptions were made. (1) The total active membership at any given point in time is approximately 105,000 (omitting those in the process of joining or resigning). (2) In the period from June 1977 through June 1978 it was assumed that approximately 30,000 new members were added to the rolls. Finally, the total membership of Common Cause was estimated at approximately 200,000.

Because the response rates of the strata differ, it is essential to apply an additional corrective weight. This weight is the inverse of the probability of responding, i.e. the response rate. Such a procedure makes the assumption that the non-responders are not dissimilar to responders. Nevertheless, weighting within the subsamples is the most reasonable of the alternatives. The final weights applied to the cases are simply the product of the inverses of the probability of selection and the probability of responding. The last column of the table shows the weighted *N* that is used throughout the analysis.

We acknowledge our debt to Mr. Charles Palit of the University of Wisconsin in resolving some of the difficult sampling and weighting issues.

We have carefully considered whether the inclusion of the defective samples in this analysis affects our results. Conceptually, the defective samples can be taken to represent the universe of individuals fulfilling the de facto stratum definitions, and universes can always be used to supplement samples so long as the weighting scheme is appropriate. Empirically, there are only minuscule differences between the univariate frequencies of the data from the strictly random samples and the univariate frequencies from all samples (the data base used in this analysis). Tables reporting these two sets of frequencies are available from the authors.

An effort was also made to survey all of the

Table A-1. Summary of Samples, Response Rates, and Weights

	Total	Adjusted	Returned	Response rate	Probability of selection	Final weight	Weighted (N)
ACLU				%			
Non-renewers	1902	1855	568	30.6	1	3	1704
Contributors	1893	1890	1101	58.3	1	2	2202
Non-contributors	1911	1904	909	47.7	1	2	1818
New members*	1914	1904	680	35.7	1	3	2040
Resigners*	2132	2107	866	41.1	1	2	1732
Active members—							
June, 1977*	3999	3680	1646	44.7	.0350	64	105,344
New members*	1000	837	328	39.2	.0465	55	18,040
Common Cause							
Members*	3059	3057	1427	46.6	.0153	140	199,780

*Received two mailings.

members of the boards of directors of state affiliates. In addition to the Washington, D.C. affiliate, 44 states had functioning state boards in early 1978. Approximately 1,600 questionnaires were sent to the states affiliates; 584 of these were returned (response rate = 36.7 percent). The rate varies substantially by state, but the mean response rate is 39.2 percent. This figure includes states that agreed to participate but did not return questionnaires, but it excludes affiliates that refused in the beginning to participate.

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